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Schuman considered  Monnet's approach of multiplying European institutions towards a European 
federation as 'a little too simple if not to say simplistic'1. Schuman was not a constitutionalist who 
believed that the ancient states of Europe would come together by politicians writing a European 
version of a Philadelphia constitution. Nor what we may call a multi-functionalist, like Monnet. 
Europe would not be built by technicians. (He thought the Monnet-inspired Pleven plan for a European 
Defence and Political Community was ill-timed and was initially concerned it would threaten the 
conclusion of the Coal and Steel Community treaty).  
 
A political system 'to replace war with new hope and concord' 
Schuman wanted to create a process so that the irreversible advancement on the road to federation was 
assured. His timetable was very long term. The process would permeate the whole of the European 
population and change their expectations like leavening in bread, creating a fusion of interests.2 But 
the initial effect would be immediate. The past 45 years of the European Union have amply 
demonstrated the validity of the process he initiated and described.  
 
Some functionalist and neo-functionalists have concentrated on the dynamics and 'spill-overs' of 
common markets. Schuman spoke of Europe's 'own internal dynamism'. It was driven by security 
needs as much as economic. This has deeper, more pervasive effects on political psychology than 
commerce. The European Coal and Steel Community created a breach in traditional international, 
political, economic, commercial, trades-union, social and regional policies. Its dynamic effect, 
although tiny at first, was equivalent to  founding a new state.  
 
Europe would be built like any state, such as France, had been in the past: pragmatically, patiently with 
a sense of the possible, said Schuman. In the case of Europe, the development would be directed to a 
final objective.3 
 
The Europe Community's social contract was 'the elimination of the age-old antagonism between 
France and Germany ... and to make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes, not 
merely unthinkable, but materially impossible.' 4 It would protect the west European peoples from 
themselves. It was to be, said Schuman eight months before his epoch-making announcement, a 
'structure like the Atlantic Alliance but for Europe'. Instead of mutual defence, it was based on mutual 
internal security. The extraordinary bond that now joins the original founding states of the Community 
contrasts starkly with two millenia of almost continual warfare. 
 
Schuman the politician 
Schuman was a highly skilled and realist politician who matured in German-occupied Lorraine where 
loyalties were highly divided, riven by nationalist, religious, linguistic and industrial disputes and with 
families divided by frontiers. As a lawyer he became an expert reconciliator and later a trusted French 
deputy after the first world war. He was largely responsible for drafting the mass of  legislation which 
harmonized different (and sometimes superior) laws and conditions in Alsace-Lorraine with those of 
France. This constitutional and legislative reconciliation preserved local advantages while cementing 
unity with France.  
 During the second world war he spoke of a community of destiny and the need to chain France and 
Germany together to prevent another war but with similar rights and duties in a union. It was no longer 
tolerable that the French Lorraine should provide Germany with iron ore and the German Ruhr supply 
France with coke so that the countries could make armaments to destroy each other.  
 
Schuman was a prime-mover in the creation in 1948-9 of the Council of Europe which was originally 
conceived also as providing structural change in the government and organisation of Europe, rather 
than being just a 'talk shop'.  
 
Key aspects of Schuman's thought involve terms like creating 'a new structure' on a European scale, 
providing a 'progressive application of human solidarity' and 'new expectations' for people. Schuman 
had been a successful minister of finance and was an expert in the economics of the state but he was 
convinced that the dynamics behind human cooperation was not driven by economic forces alone.  
 
Schuman spoke often of certain aspects being the foundation of the European building. Timing was 
crucial to fulfil needs and encourage healthy development and growth of expectations. Furthermore 
there had to be a synchrony between the foundation of a European framework and that of the German 
Federal Republic. Positive feedback was essential in the growth of both. In Germany it was essential to 
provide positive reinforcement of a democratic, European future in the first few months of the new 
Federal German government.  
 
Schuman clearly had strong ideas about how and when this would happen since he was instrumental 
with Acheson in stripping a complex of military controls off Germany and hastening the day for the 
return to civil government.5 This, in fact, drastically shortened the time he had to create the real 
beginning of Europe. It was a dangerous course. In his view if Germany regained its own government 
without the expectation of a European future, it was likely to return to nationalism, demand German 
unity (with the return of the eastern zone) and achieve it by playing off the Soviets against the West. 
Western Germany  had 13 million refugees from the east in1950 (20 per cent of the population). In the 
northern province of Schleswig-Holstein, where three out of four people were refugees and the 
unemployment rate was 28 per cent, a diplomat described it as a powder-keg.6 
 
A real beginning of a European structure in a peaceful and democratic way  would counter the 
expected return to the old mould of German nationalism and militarism. In 1949-50 both Acheson and 
Schuman worried about what way Germany would turn in the next ten years. The future was by no 
means sure.     
 
What would create a new dynamic? In a speech in New York in 1949, Schuman spoke prophetically 
about France's responsibilities in creating a new European organisation, 'a permanent common 
structure of which the Council of Europe is only a prefiguration.' This would be based, not on the 
balance of power politics of Talleyrand and Metternich, but on reconciliation, peace politics and reborn 
confidence and solidarity.  
 
Schuman emphasis on 'structural interdependence' 
The archives now open show that the development of European Union did not proceed from the failure 
of the Council of Europe to provide the kernel of this structure and then move on to functionalist 
institutions like the Coal and Steel Community. One of his first actions as Foreign Minister had been to 
explore the means to create a new structural interdependence between France and Germany. In 
October 1948 Schuman discussed a range of projects with Adenauer about creating a structural or 
organisational interdependence between France and Germany ... even before Adenauer became 
chancellor of the new state. The Saar would be returned to Germany, he said.7 
 
The idea of creating a European pool for steel was already proposed in internal Quai d'Orsay 
documents as early as 1948. The big problems were how could this be introduced given the enormous 
political, economic, military and commercial interests and opposition involved.  
 In Schuman's private collection of news clippings there is a copy of a Newsweek article of  January 24 
1949  featuring Schuman and his Germany policy, Toward a French-German Alliance? The details 
indicate it was a non-attributable interview with Schuman himself.  
 
It begins with an extract of a Le Monde article, which appears to be 'inspired' by the Quai d'Orsay. The 
problem of the Ruhr can only be solved in the framework of Europe, it says. France can try to paralyze 
Germany or rebuild Europe; one excludes the other. There is only one solution, it continued, and that is 
to render a Franco-German war unthinkable, by the development of such tight bonds between 
continental nations that a European conflict would become just as inconceivable as a Franco-British or 
Anglo-American war is today. The Newsweek article also quotes Schuman's interview with the 
German agency Sudena. He said that hatred and vengeance had been removed from French policy 
towards Germany with a speed that would have been thought impossible after the first world war.  
 
The new International Ruhr Authority would only be acceptable to Germans, Newsweek continues, if 
it were extended to Lorraine ore, Saar coal and Belgian and Luxembourg heavy industry. 'French 
officials freely discuss putting French coal mines under international control similar to that regulating 
the Ruhr. But they seek a political solution first. It is in this phase that Foreign Minister Schuman has - 
particularly in the opinion of the Americans - shown himself sensible and farsighted in dealing with 
Germany. He has made several trips to the Reich ... '  
 
Why did Schuman focus on coal and steel8? Rather than defence against potential German aggression, 
Schuman's emphasis was on security and building trust. The Ruhr was his research field for an 
antibiotic against war.9 He also wanted a 'polyvalent' solution for several problems: economic, 
political, and moral. Some other reasons:  
 
1. Politically, the Marshall Plan showed that arriving at common European viewpoints proved elusive. 
2. A divide appeared with British insistence on not creating an effective European structure 
immediately, while in Schuman's view such a new organisation was essential for internal European 
security. Schuman was reluctant to move without the British, but would have gone alone without them 
on the Council of Europe if in fact a compromise had not been found. He used a pragmatic method on 
coal and steel, hoping the British would join. 3. Economically, discussions on generalised customs 
unions with Italy and the Benelux countries showed they got bogged down in impossible detail and 
complications. 4. Psychologically, a long drawn out discussion would not provide the strong dynamic 
to turn the future of Germany away from its traditional path of development. 5. German nationalism 
was rising again. It is important to recall that the younger generation of Germans had never really 
experienced democracy.  'Wars have ravaged hearts and minds more ruinously than material 
devastation,' he said in 1949.10 
 
For Schuman the state should at least satisfy five basic human needs: protecting the population from 
destruction, providing for its physical and moral well-being, and encouraging its intellectual and 
spiritual development.11 Preventing war in a new security system responded to the most basic of 
human needs. Coal and steel were considered essential elements of the armaments industry. 'Of capital 
importance,' wrote Schuman about the Coal and Steel Community, 'was the political objective which 
was to put a definitive end to Franco-German antagonism.'12 Britain was less concerned with internal 
European security and consequently was little attracted to the idea. In very simplified schematic form, 
European preoccupations are summarized in the table below. 
 
Conclusions 
Schuman's policy was to reinforce democracy and a European ideal in Germany by a positive and 
healthy development of the state (in contrast to the mistakes he had witnessed in the 1920s). His 
European policy was strongly based on France and Germany and the prevention of a new antagonism. 
His method on taking over the Quai d'Orsay in 1948 was to prepare a security system based on primary 
arms industries that would make war impossible and reinforce organisational interdependence of 
European states to create a long-term dynamic of unity in many fields. 
   France  Germany  Britain 
Effects of war  Devastation, post-war  Devastation,  Victory, world    divisions,  lack  of  starvation  prestige. 
    security demoralisation, lack  Reinforcement of 
      of security, division  island security,  
    of  country,  refugees.    importance  of 
     E m p i r e / C o m m o n - w e a  
     lth.  Impoverishment 
 
  Political concerns Communism,  Allied occupation.  Class problems, 
  1945-50 Gaullism, overthrow  Lack of  state  nationalisation of  
    of state?; Soviet  apparatus, democratic  industries, junior 
    military invasion?  tradition; Berlin  member Big 3 with 
    blockade,  German US  and  USSR 
    unity?  Saar,  Ruhr   
 
 Expected  dynamic  Democratic?  Democratic? Socialism.  Turn 
    Authoritarian? Authoritarian? Empire  into 
   Immobilisme?  Invasion?  Commonwealth. 
     Return  to  world 
     power  status? 
     Defence  /NATO 
 
  Economic concerns  Black market  Black market   Rationing 
    Inflation, devaluation  Dollar shortage  Devaluation 
    Dollar shortage  Industrial dismantling  Dollar shortage 
    (Marshall Plan)  Creating an economic   
    Reforming economic  system (Erhard)   
   system    
 
  US policy  From dragging  Front line state  From potential leader 
  perspective  partner on German  against Soviet  in Europe to dragging 
    policy to leader for  aggression; from partner in US 
    European policy. pastoral (Morgenthau)  European policy; 
      state  to economic  collapse as world 
    power-house  power. 
 
  Schuman's action Resist authoritarianism, Reinforce  democracy,   
  1.Prime Minister  reinforce democracy  end territorial   
  1947-8;    disputes, provide Try todraw GB into 
  2. Foreign    European beginning  European dynamic 
  Minister 1948-53 Prepare ground for  and expectation: 1   
    European solution  fusion of interests,   
    2.Council  of  Europe;   
    3   E C S C  
 